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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Alonzo Harris entered a conditional guilty plea to each 
of five counts charging him with armed bank robbery.  His appeal 
from his conviction presents five issues:  whether the court 
erred (1) in refusing to suppress a series of inculpatory 
statements given by Harris to various law enforcement personnel; 
(2) in declining to allow Harris to withdraw his plea on the eve 
of sentencing; (3) in failing to provide a sufficient explanation 
for its decision to raise Harris' criminal history level from 
category I to category VI pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; (4) in 
adding four points to Harris' offense level because the mace the 
district court found he had used on two tellers during one of the 
robberies was a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D); and (5) by enhancing Harris' offense level an 
additional two points because, as a result of being "maced," the 
tellers sustained "bodily injuries" within the meaning of 




 On May 7, 1993, the Pittsburgh police obtained an 
arrest warrant for Harris in connection with a shooting at the 
Hampton Inn in the Oakland section of the city.  Harris 
voluntarily surrendered the next day and was taken into custody.  
During the remainder of that day and the next, Harris provided 
the authorities with extensive tape recorded and written 
statements detailing his role in five bank robberies which 
occurred in 1992.  Prior to the making of these statements, the 
police had not suspected him of committing any of these 
robberies.   
 Harris first described the robbery of the Morningside 
Branch of the Laurel Savings Association.  According to Harris' 
statement, he drove to the bank in a van with a friend, Charlie 
Brown.  As Harris entered the bank, he carried a pellet gun and a 
can of mace.  According to Harris, he took money from two tellers 
and, as he fled, attempted to spray mace at one of them to 
prevent her from seeing the direction in which he fled. 
 Harris next described an October 23, 1992, robbery of 
the Fidelity Savings Association on East Ohio Street in 
Pittsburgh.  Brown carried a pellet gun into the bank and took 
money from a teller, while Harris picked money out of a cash 
drawer.   
 On the day after being taken into custody, Harris 
talked about the other three robberies at issue here.  First, he 
described the July 30, 1992, robbery of the Allegheny Valley Bank 
  
in Blawnox, during which he carried a toy gun.  Next, Harris 
spoke of the June 29, 1992, robbery of the Laurel Savings 
Association in Etna.  On this occasion, Harris carried a can of 
mace and Brown carried a gun.  After a teller gave them the money 
in her cash drawer, Harris sprayed mace in the air.  Finally, 
Harris described the June 15, 1992, robbery of the Integra Bank 
in New Kensington.  Harris and a man named "Vernor" were wearing 
ski masks and had one gun between them.   
 After Harris made these initial statements, the FBI was 
contacted.  On May 11, 1993, FBI agents obtained further 
statements from Harris regarding his role in several other 
crimes.  
 After being indicted for the robberies that occurred in 
1992, Harris filed a motion to suppress the statements he had 
given.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
denied Harris' motion.  Harris thereafter entered conditional 
pleas of guilty to the five counts of the indictment charging 
armed bank robbery and thereby preserved the suppression issue 
for appellate review. 
 On November 30, 1993, after the presentence report had 
been prepared and Harris' sentencing had been set for December 3, 
1993, Harris filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  At the 
hearing originally scheduled as a sentencing hearing, the 
district court denied this motion, heard argument on several 
sentencing issues, and made tentative findings with respect to 
those issues.  Counsel was given permission to file objections to 
  
the tentative findings by December 6, 1993, and sentencing was 
continued until that date. 
 Harris was ultimately assigned a total offense level of 
32, a criminal history category of VI, and a guideline sentencing 
range of 210-262 months.  He was sentenced to concurrent 21-year 
terms of imprisonment (252 months); five years of supervised 
release; payment of restitution to the victim banks in the sum of 
$25,783; and a special assessment of $225. 
 
 II. 
 Harris insists that the statements he sought to 
suppress were coerced.  The district court found that they were 
not.  We review the district court's finding of historic fact for 
clear error; our review of its ultimate conclusion regarding the 
absence of coercion is plenary.  Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 
115-17 (1985); United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1027 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 In support of his contention that his "will was 
overborne" and that the waiver of his constitutional rights was 
not "the product of a rational intellect and a free will," App. 
97, Harris testified that he was intimidated by the fact that his 
legs were shackled, the fact that he was not free to leave the 
room in which he was questioned, and the fact that the officers 
with him in the room were wearing guns.  He also testified that 
he had consumed forty ounces of "Old English" before he 
surrendered himself and that the effects of this consumption had 
not dissipated when he decided to confess. 
  
 The district court found that Harris had been advised 
of his constitutional rights on at least three occasions and that 
he had "voluntarily and understandingly" waived those rights.  
App. 149.  It noted that the audio tapes established that Harris 
was "calm and rational" and "had no fear in his voice."  Id.  The 
court further noted that Harris had voluntarily surrendered and, 
as evidenced by Harris' own statements on the tape, he had been 
treated well by both the Pittsburgh police and the FBI.  Finally, 
the court found that there was "no evidence" of threats, promises 
or pressures of any kind and "no credible evidence" that Harris 
was under the influence of alcohol.  App. 149, 150. 
 There is ample evidence to support the district court's 
findings regarding the circumstances under which Harris' 
statements were given and, based on these findings, we conclude 
that Harris waived his constitutional rights voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the consequences of doing so. 
 
 III. 
 At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas, Harris testified that "it was fear that drove" him to 
plead guilty and that he wanted to withdraw those pleas because 
he was "truly innocent."  App. 193.  However, he did not further 
explain the "fear" that had allegedly coerced the pleas, and he 
offered no evidence tending to show that the detailed accounts of 
the bank robberies in his statements were untrue.  The district 
court declined to permit withdrawal.  We will review its ruling 
  
under an abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Huff, 
873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 Quoting from United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 
(3d Cir. 1992), the district court explained that a "defendant 
must . . . not only reassert [his] innocence, but give sufficient 
reasons to explain why contradictory positions were taken before 
the district court and why permission should be given to withdraw 
the guilty plea."  App. 200.  The court concluded that Harris had 
failed to explain his earlier statements and that, accordingly, 
his conclusory assertion of innocence was not credible.  It 
further concluded that the reason Harris wanted to change his 
pleas was that he "had a change of heart after reading the 
presentence report and contemplating the possible sentence."  
App. 200.  Citing United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 712 (3d 
Cir. 1989), the court concluded that this reason was inadequate 
to justify withdrawal.  Finally, the district court noted that, 
under Third Circuit jurisprudence, withdrawal may be denied in 
circumstances like those before it even if no prejudice to the 
government is shown.  See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111 
(3d Cir. 1986).1 
                     
1
.  In Martinez, we observed: 
 
  In evaluating a motion under Rule 32(d), 
we have looked primarily to three factors:  
"(1) whether the defendant asserts his 
innocence; (2) whether the government would 
be prejudiced by withdrawal; and (3) the 
strength of the defendant's reasons for 
moving to withdraw."  [United States v. 
Trott, 779 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1985).] 
 
 * * * *  
  
 We can find no fault with the district court's 
analysis, and its decision to deny the permission sought was well 
within the bounds of its discretion. 
 
 IV. 
 Having concluded that Harris' conviction must stand, we 
turn to the more troublesome sentencing issues that he raises.  
The first concerns the district court's decision to raise his 
criminal history level from category I. 
 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 provides in relevant part: 
  If reliable information indicates that 
the criminal history category does not 
adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
(..continued) 
 
 . . . Martinez urges us to adopt the position 
of a minority of the courts of appeals that 
absent any showing of prejudice to the 
government, withdrawal should be freely 
granted.  See generally United States v. 
Thompson, 680 F.2d 1145, 1150-51 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089, 103 S. Ct. 573, 
74 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1982).  We are constrained, 
however, to reject this position as contrary 
to the 1983 amendments to Rule 32(d).  The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1983 
amendments state that amended Rule 32(d) 
embodies the approach of United States v. 
Saft, 448 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1977).  Under 
that approach, "[t]he Government is not 
required to show prejudice when a defendant 
has shown no sufficient grounds for 
permitting withdrawal of a plea."  Id. at 
1083.  Thus, even assuming that the 
government has failed to show prejudice, we 
must affirm the district court's decision 
because Martinez has failed to demonstrate 
sufficient grounds for withdrawing his plea. 
 
785 F.2d at 114, 115-16. 
  
defendant's past criminal conduct or the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit 
other crimes, the court may consider imposing 
a sentence departing from the otherwise 
applicable guideline range.  Such information 
may include, but is not limited to, 
information concerning: . . .  (e) prior 
similar adult criminal conduct not resulting 
in a criminal conviction.   
 
  A departure under this provision is 
warranted when the criminal history category 
significantly under-represents the 
seriousness of the defendant's criminal 
history or the likelihood that the defendant 
will commit further crimes. 
 
 * * * * 
 
  In considering a departure under this 
provision, the Commission intends that the 
court use, as a reference, the guideline 
range for a defendant with a higher or lower 
criminal history category, as applicable.  
For example, if the court concludes that the 
defendant's criminal history category of III 
significantly under-represents the 
seriousness of the defendant's criminal 
history, and that the seriousness of the 
defendant's criminal history most closely 
resembles that of most defendants with  
Criminal History Category IV, the court 
should look to the guideline range specified 
for a defendant with Criminal History 
Category IV to guide its departure. 
 In United States v. Hickman, 991 F.2d 1110 (3d Cir. 
1993), this court remanded a case for resentencing because it 
found that the district court had not properly completed the 
necessary step-by-step procedure that must occur prior to an 
increase under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.  In Hickman, the defendant's 
prior record placed him in criminal history category III.  The 
district court, however, believed that this resulted in a 
  
sentence which did not adequately represent Hickman's long 
history of similar conduct.  Therefore, it departed upward under 
§ 4A1.3 by "doubling the top of the guideline range."  Id. at 
1113.  The district court gave no further explanation for the 
specific sentence.  The record, however, reflected that the court 
was motivated by the fact that Hickman, at 65, was still engaged 
in criminal activity even though his history of fraud type 
offenses went back to 1953. 
 This court held in Hickman that a district court must 
follow the procedure contemplated by § 4A1.3 when choosing to 
depart upward from the criminal history category originally 
calculated for the defendant. 
 Under this [§ 4A1.3] regime, the court is 
obliged to determine which category (of those 
higher than the category originally 
calculated for the defendant) best represents 
the defendant's prior criminal history.  The 
court then uses the corresponding sentencing 
range to "guide its departure."  Moreover, 
the court is obliged to proceed sequentially 
through these categories.  It may not move to 
the next higher category until it has found 
that a prior category still fails to 
adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
defendant's past criminal conduct.   
Id. at 1114.  We then went on to quote the following passage from 
a Second Circuit case: 
  The reason for obliging a judge to 
examine the next higher categories in 
sequence is that these categories reflect the 
Commission's careful assessment of how much 
incremental punishment a defendant should 
receive in light of the various degrees of a 
prior record.   
  
Id. at 1114 (quoting United States v. Coe, 891 F.2d 405, 413 (2d 
Cir. 1989)).  We ultimately concluded that, although the district 
court was justifiably outraged by the defendant's long history of 
fraud, the court erred when it "jumped more than three criminal 
history categories without explanation and, a fortiori, without 
going through the ratcheting procedure prescribed by the 
Guidelines."  Id.   
 The presentence report in this case found that Harris 
had only one criminal history point resulting from a 1992 
conviction of robbery, reckless endangerment, and related 
offenses.  Thus, the report gave him a criminal history category 
of I.  However, the presentence report also listed Harris' 
extensive criminal background as a possible ground for departure.  
The report indicated that Harris was currently charged in four 
pending state prosecutions in Allegheny County.  The first 
prosecution involved a murder.  The second was for robbery and 
assault.  The third prosecution consisted of 16 counts of robbery 
of various business establishments.  The fourth consisted of 12 
counts of robbery of other businesses.  According to the report, 
Harris had confessed his involvement in all of the pending 
charges.  Harris also admitted that he had been present at a 
drug-related murder committed by another.   
 At sentencing, the district court exercised the 
authority conferred upon it by § 4A1.3, with the following 
explanation: 
 According to the probation officer, the 
criminal history category is one. 
 
  
  However, the probation officer stated 
that he believed the defendant's criminal 
behavior constitutes a criminal history 
category which is higher.  We find that the 
appropriate criminal history category in this 
case is six. 
 
  We find that the application of criminal 
history categories two, three, four and five 
are too lenient for the conduct in this case. 
 
 * * * * 
 
  Hence, we find [that] the information 
[concerning the defendant's criminal 
activity] is reliable and we further find 
that it is highly likely that if released, 
the defendant will commit other predatory 
street crimes. 
 
App. 277, 278.  After describing the crimes charged in the 
indictments to which Harris had confessed, the court concluded: 
  Mr. Harris is a predatory street 
criminal who has a propensity for violence of 
the most egregious type.  We find that he is 
a danger to the community and will repeat 




 We agree with the government that Hickman does not 
"require the district court to go through a ritualistic exercise 
in which it mechanically discusses each criminal history category 
it rejects en route to the category that it selects."  United 
States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1993)(en banc).  
Hickman and the objective of the § 4A1.3 ratcheting process do 
require, however, that the sentencing court's reasons for 
rejecting each lesser category be clear from the record as a 
whole.  While it is clear to us from the record that the district 
court justifiably regarded Harris' past record as horrendous and 
  
his prospects for the future abysmal, the requirements of § 4A1.3 
are not met by its declaration that "criminal history categories 
two, three, four and five are too lenient for the conduct in this 
case."  App. 277. 
 First, the district court's conclusion that the lesser 
categories were "too lenient" suggests to us that its focus may 
have been on whether the result produced by the ratcheting 
process was appropriate, that is, on whether the sentencing range 
arrived at by using the lesser intervening categories was too 
lenient, in the eyes of the district court, for someone with 
Harris' past conduct and prospects for the future.  This is 
precisely the kind of subjective judgment the ratcheting process 
was designed to avoid.  The proper focus of § 4A1.3 analysis is a 
comparison of the frequency and seriousness of the conduct 
comprising the defendant's criminal history with the conduct of 
others who fall into each category. 
 Even if it were reasonably clear that the district 
court's analysis had the appropriate focus, however, we would 
still find the cryptic articulation of its reasoning too 
conclusory to permit us to perform our review function and 
attempt to assure the uniformity of sentencing that Congress 
sought to achieve.  The insufficiency of the district court's 
explanation concerning the appropriateness of criminal history 
category VI and the inappropriateness of each lesser category is 
well illustrated by a consideration of the contentions of the 
parties regarding the appropriate criminal history category, 
contentions that were not commented upon by the district court.  
  
 Harris contends that he should be assigned a criminal 
history category no higher than the category he would have been 
assigned if he had been convicted of the charges reported by the 
presentence report to be pending against him.  According to 
Harris, this would be a category III.  He argues that if he were 
convicted for the crimes in paragraphs 86-89 of the presentence 
report, which were the basis for the upward departure, he would 
only receive a total of 6 points beyond the single point 
resulting from his conviction.  The presentence investigator 
reported that under an existing plea agreement Harris would 
receive a single term of life imprisonment for all these crimes.  
Since he was to receive only one sentence for the four pending 
cases, according to Harris, these cases should be treated as 
yielding only one prior sentence under § 4A1.1(a).2  Thus, he 
would receive 3 points under § 4A.1(a), which directs the courts 
to add "3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment 
exceeding one year and one month."  Harris admits that he would 
also receive 3 additional points since all of the crimes involved 
violence.3  Harris thus concludes that if he had been sentenced 
                     
2
.  Section 4A1.2(a)(2) states that "[p]rior sentences imposed in 
related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of § 
4A1.1(a), (b), and (c)."   The commentary to § 4A1.2 states that 
prior cases are "related" if they "were consolidated for trial or 
sentencing."  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.3). 
3
.  Under § 4A1.1(f), the court is directed to add "1 point for 
each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of 
violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b) or (c) 
above because such sentence was considered related to another 
sentence . . . up to a total of 3 points."  Thus, since all four 
prior cases involved crimes of violence, and since three of those 
cases did not receive additional points under § 4A1.1(a), one 
  
for the four cases pending in the Court of Common Pleas, he would 
have 6 total criminal history category points, placing him in 
category III, rather than category VI. 
   The government, on the other hand, points out that if 
each case charged in paragraphs 86-89 of the presentence report 
were resolved separately and Harris were sentenced in each case, 
he would receive an additional three points for each case, 
amounting to 12 additional points, enough to place him in 
category VI.  This, the government insists, is the relevant 
consideration when the court is attempting to find the criminal 
history category that adequately reflects the defendant's prior 
criminal conduct and future prospects. 
 The task before the sentencing court in these 
circumstances is to identify the category which encompasses those 
defendants whose criminal histories "most closely resemble[]" the 
defendant's own.  See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.  Where the defendant has 
confessed to the commission of serious crimes for which he has 
not been convicted, it would certainly seem to us reasonable for 
a sentencing court to consider what the defendant's criminal 
history category would be if he had been convicted of those 
crimes.  Moreover, when the conduct underlying the defendant's 
prior offenses is as transactionally unrelated as the conduct 
underlying the four prosecutions against Harris, adoption of the 
government's approach by the sentencing court would provide a 
(..continued) 
point for each of those cases would be added.  See U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.1, comment. (n.6). 
  
sustainable basis for rejecting categories II, III, IV and V and 
embracing category VI.  It is impossible to determine from this 
record, however, whether the district court adopted the 
government's approach.  As we have noted, it commented on neither 
the government's nor Harris' analysis.  This is not to say that  
§ 4A1.3 limits the court's discretion in a situation of this kind 
to a guideline calculation of the points that would have been 
received if pending charges were convictions.  Indeed, § 4A1.3 is 
intended to provide flexibility in those cases where a point-by-
point calculation of the defendant's criminal history category is 
not alone sufficient to reflect his culpability and 
dangerousness.4  To this end, it confers discretion on the 
district court to consider the particular facts relating to a 
defendant's past criminal conduct in reaching a judgment on the 
seriousness of that conduct and the likelihood of recidivism.   
 A consideration of the relevant reliable data in this 
case could clearly lead a sentencing court to a conclusion that 
anything less than category VI would underrepresent the 
defendant's past criminal conduct.  That is not the problem here.  
The problem is rather that we do not know what it was about the 
particular facts of Harris' case that led the district court to 
                     
4
.  It is for this reason that we reject Harris' argument that 
his calculation leading to a criminal history category of III 
places a ceiling on the district court's authority to depart 
upward.  We also note that his calculation may be flawed.  If 
Harris is awarded an additional point for the conviction of armed 
robbery detailed in paragraph 81 of the presentence report, his 
total points, even adopting his theory, would appear to be 7, 
placing him in category IV. 
  
believe him more culpable and more dangerous than those for whom 
categories II, III, IV and V were intended.  Accordingly, our 
decision in Hickman mandates resentencing. 
 V. 
 The district court gave Harris a four point upward 
adjustment in calculating the sentence for the robbery charged in 
count IV because it viewed the mace Harris was found to have used 
on two tellers as a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of 
U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).5  A "dangerous weapon" is defined in the 
Guidelines as "an instrument capable of inflicting death or 
serious bodily injury."  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(d)).  In 
turn, the Guidelines define a serious bodily injury as an "injury 
involving extreme physical pain or the impairment of a function 
of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring 
medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or 
physical rehabilitation."  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(j)).  
Because the adjusted offense level for count IV was higher than 
the adjusted offense levels for the other four counts, it 
determined Harris' combined adjusted offense level.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.4. 
 The spray that Harris used during this bank robbery was 
a product called Phaser Mace which Harris purchased at an Army & 
Navy Store.  At the hearing, the government, in support of its 
position that Phaser Mace spray was a dangerous weapon, 
                     
5
.  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) provides:  "if a dangerous weapon 
was otherwise used [during a robbery], increase by 4 levels." 
  
introduced a promotional "Bulletin" about a "pepper spray."  The 
bulletin had been issued by Zarc International, Inc., the 
manufacturer of CAP-STUN, "an oleoresin capsicum ('OC') product 
used safely by law enforcement for more than a decade."  App. 
230.  This document reported the death of a man whom police had 
sprayed with a product called First Strike, a "pepper spray" 
manufactured by a competitor.  The autopsy report was reported to 
have concluded the cause of death to be "asphyxia due to 
bronchospasm precipitated by pepper spray."  Id.  The Bulletin 
was careful to distinguish First Strike from CAP-STUN, which "has 
undergone extensive toxicological testing and has proven to 
present no potential danger to the human physiological system."  
App. 231.  It noted that First Strike's ingredients were a "trade 
secret" and thus unknown and that it was "delivered in a liquid 
stream."  Id.  The Bulletin further cautioned that "until the 
ongoing investigations [into the death] are completed, 
conclusions about First Strike would be premature."  App. 230. 
 The government also tendered the testimony of the 
probation officer who had prepared the presentence report.  He 
expressed the opinion that, if a pepper spray could cause the 
death reported in the Bulletin, then the mace used by Harris 
"could also cause serious bodily injury."  App. 241-42. 
 The only other relevant evidence before the district 
court on this issue was (1) a pamphlet tendered by Harris which 
had been published by the makers of Phaser Mace, and (2) the 
testimony of an FBI agent who arrived at the scene of the robbery 
and spoke with the tellers who had been sprayed.  The pamphlet 
  
asserted that Phaser Mace had been used for many years without 
serious injury and that its effects lasted no longer than 10 to 
15 minutes.  As the government stresses, however, it also states: 
  When an individual(s) receives a blast 
from the PHASER, he will experience extreme 
discomfort and disorientation.  The first is 
usually a severe stinging/burning sensation 
to any affected part of the body.  This is 
followed immediately by involuntary closing 
of the eyes due to the swelling of blood 
vessels causing temporary blindness.  The 
victim will then experience respiratory 
problems and a choking sensation.  All of 
this will occur within a matter of 1-2 
seconds.  It is important to keep in mind 
that all this is happening to an individual 
who is totally unsuspecting.  In the vast 
majority of occurrences the victim will also 
experience disorientation which creates a 
feeling of panic to accompany the other 
symptoms.  These symptoms will last from 10-
15 minutes.  
 
 * * * * 
  
  A one second burst of PHASER is 
sufficient to incapacitate the average 
person. 
App. 234. 
 On direct, the FBI agent testified: 
 Q.  Did you debrief the two tellers 
concerning that bank: 
 
 A.  Yes. 
 
 Q.  Did they relate to you whether they were 
in need of any medical attention after being 
sprayed in the face with the mace by the 
defendant in this case? 
 
 A.  Yes.  An ambulance showed up, according 
to [the] teller, [sic] they both required 
medical attention for their eyes, and one had 
problems breathing.  She had an asthma 




 On cross-examination, the agent provided the following 
context for his direct testimony: 
 Q.  Now, you said that paramedics showed up 
after the robbery? 
 
 A.  Yes. 
 
 Q.  And they were treated by the paramedics, 
the two tellers, both tellers? 
 
 A.  Yes, both of them received medical 
attention on the scene. 
 
 Q.  That consisted of what -- washing out 
their eyes? 
 
 A.  I wasn't present.  All I observed was the 
emergency medical personnel walk into the 
bank and go towards both tellers.  At that 
point I left the bank. 
 
 Q.  So you don't know what type of treatment 
they were given? 
 
 A.  No, sir. 
 
 Q.  Neither teller was placed in the 
ambulance and taken to the hospital; is that 
correct? 
 
 A.  Neither of them left the bank to the best 
of my knowledge. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 Q.  They were both able to talk to you? 
 
 A.  Yes. 
 
 Q.  And you interviewed them within an hour 
after their treatment, maybe less? 
 
 A.  Probably less. 
 
 Q.  Half hour, maybe even less than that . . .? 
  
 
 A.  Half hour. 
App. 258-59. 
 The district court's findings on this issue and the one 
addressed in the next section of this opinion were articulated 
together at the sentencing hearing: 
  The probation officer . . . added four 
points because the defendant used a dangerous 
weapon, that is, spraying mace in the face of 
the bank teller and thereby increased his 
base offense level by four. 
 
  That conclusion is supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The probation 
officer then added two additional points 
because the offense involved the spraying of 
mace in the face of a bank teller and 
increased two levels for bodily injury, 
generating an adjusted offense level of 28.  
Each of those findings are supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
  We find that use of mace during the 
commission of a felony constitutes infliction 
of serious bodily injury with a dangerous 
weapon.  The evidence preponderates the use 
of mace is a dangerous weapon and constitutes 
infliction of serious bodily injury. 
 
 . . . we find that a victim of mace sustains 
a significant injury.  Indeed, there is 
evidence of record, too, that two tellers 
required immediate medical attention, and 
there is further evidence of record of a 
death that was caused in North Carolina 
following the application of mace.  Such 
evidence should not be ignored. 
App. 274-75. 
 The parties agree that the government had the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Harris used an 
"instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily 
  
injury."  See United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Moreover, we have insisted that "[i]nformation used as a 
basis for sentencing under the Guidelines must have 'sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.'"  Id.   
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)).  Indeed, we have counseled that 
"this standard should be applied rigorously."  Id. at 664. 
 We hold that the government did not meet its burden and 
that the district court erred in adding four points to the 
sentencing calculation for count IV based on the current record.  
The Zarc Bulletin lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for 
the purpose for which it was used by the district court.  First, 
it was promotional literature emanating from a competitor of the 
product which may have caused the reported death in North 
Carolina.  Second, even this competitor, with its inherent bias, 
acknowledged that the limited information about the incident 
rendered conclusions about the dangerousness of First Strike 
"premature."  Third, and most important, the district court 
lacked any basis for determining what First Strike is and whether 
it bears any significant resemblance to Phaser Mace.  The 
probation officer's testimony, based as it was on the Bulletin, 
similarly lacked reliability. 
 The most probative evidence available to the district 
court of the capabilities of Phaser Mace was its own promotional 
literature.  That literature reported that it had been used for 
many years without serious injury.  Although the district court 
would have been justified in discounting this claim on the basis 
of its source, a discounted claim cannot carry the government's 
  
burden in the absence of any evidence calling it into question.  
The remainder of the pamphlet provides no reason to question that 
claim.  While it describes "temporary blindness," "respiratory 
problems," "a choking sensation," "disorientation," and a 
"feeling of panic," all of this is accompanied by the assurance 
that these effects last only 10 or 15 minutes and leave no 
residual incapacity.   
 Phaser Mace is thus clearly reported in its promotional 
literature to be incapable of causing death.  Although that 
literature refers to "extreme discomfort," we do not believe that 
this claim, particularly given its self-serving nature, provides 
a reliable basis for concluding that Phaser Mace inflicts 
"extreme pain" as that term is used in the definition of serious 
bodily injury.  It necessarily follows that the promotional 
pamphlet provides an inadequate basis for concluding that Phaser 
Mace is a dangerous weapon.  Finally, the very limited testimony 
of the FBI agent about the effect of Phaser Mace on the two 
tellers is entirely consistent with the claims of the pamphlet 
and adds little to the government's case. 
 
 VI. 
 The final issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
district court erred when it increased Harris' offense level for 
count IV by two under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) because two 
tellers were found to have sustained "bodily injuries" as a 
result of being sprayed with mace.   
  
 Section 2B3.1(b)(3) establishes a graduated scale for 
those cases in which a victim "sustained bodily injury":  
 If any victim sustained bodily injury, 
increase the offense level according to the 
seriousness of the injury: 
 
 Degree of Bodily Injury       Increase in Level 
 
 (A) Bodily Injury                     add 2 
 (B) Serious Bodily Injury             add 4 
 (C) Permanent or Life-Threatening 
     Bodily Injury                     add 6 
 
 (D) If the degree of injury is between that 
specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), add 3 
levels; or 
 
 (E) If the degree of injury is between that 
specified in subdivisions (B) and (C), add 5 
levels. 
 
 The Application Notes of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 provide the 
following definitions for the terms used in this graduated scale: 
 "Bodily injury" means any significant injury; 
e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, 
or is of a type for which medical attention 
ordinarily would be sought. 
 
 "Serious bodily injury" means injury 
involving extreme physical pain or the 
impairment of a function of a bodily member, 
organ, or mental faculty; or requiring 
medical intervention such as surgery, 
hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.  
 
 "Permanent or life-threatening bodily injury" 
means injury involving a substantial risk of 
death; loss or substantial impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 
faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an 
obvious disfigurement that is likely to be 
permanent. 
 Where a particular situation falls on this analogue 
scale is an issue the Commission clearly intended to be resolved 
  
on a case-by-case basis after a fact-specific inquiry into the 
circumstances of the particular crime and its impact on the 
victims.  See United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 278-79 (7th 
Cir. 1994); United States v. Lancaster, 6 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 
1993).  A sentencing court's resolution of this issue is a 
finding of fact that will be disturbed on appellate review only 
if clearly erroneous.  See United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 
126 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 The district court in this case made only one brief 
reference to the particular circumstances of this case, citing 
the FBI agent's testimony that the tellers "required immediate 
medical attention."  The court's primary focus, however, was not 
on what happened in this case.  It found the reported North 
Carolina death important and cast its ultimate finding in terms 
of the non-case-specific conclusion that "a victim of mace 
sustains a significant injury."  App. 275. 
 The difficulty with the district court's approach can 
best be illustrated by comparing two cases from other courts of 
appeals which present the question of whether a victim of the 
defendant's crime had received "bodily injury" from mace.   
 In United States v. Lancaster, 6 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 
1993), a security guard had been sprayed with mace during a 
robbery and had suffered "severe burning in his eyes and cheeks."  
Id. at 209.  The district court found that no "bodily injury" 
occurred.  The court of appeals held that this finding was not 
clearly erroneous.  In the course of doing so it observed: 
  
 While the burning in [the security guard's] 
eyes and cheeks caused by the mace was 
undoubtedly unpleasant, and could not be 
described as wholly trivial, it was only 
momentary and the mace produced no lasting 
harm.   
 
Id. at 210. 
 
 The Lancaster court gave the following explanation of 
why the district court's finding was consistent with the 
Guideline's definition of "bodily injury" as, inter alia, "an 
injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for which 
medical attention ordinarily would be sought."  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, 
comment. (n.1(b)). 
 Trivial injuries are not noticeably painful 
nor are they normally obvious to an observer.  
A momentary injury may be immediately 
"painful," but it is not "obvious" as we feel 
that term is intended in this context because 
it disappears quickly.   
 
  It is also consistent with Application 
Note 1(b)'s elaboration of "significant 
injury" as being an injury "of a type for 
which medical attention ordinarily will [sic] 
be sought."  Medical attention is not 
ordinarily sought for wholly trivial 
injuries.  And while people who have 
sustained purely momentary injuries may often 
choose to be examined by a doctor as a 
precautionary measure to ensure that they 
have sustained no lasting harm, we do not 
understand such precautionary examinations to 
be the type of "medical attention" that the 
Guidelines contemplate to make an injury 
"significant." 
 
Lancaster, 6 F.3d at 210 n.2. 
 
 In United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 
1994), the court upheld, as not clearly erroneous, the district 
  
court's determination that bank tellers had suffered a "bodily 
injury" after being sprayed with mace: 
  The bank tellers who were sprayed 
experienced pain which lasted for hours and 
had some residual effect for days.  The 
district court could properly make the 
factual finding that this was painful and 
obvious. 
 
The court distinguished Lancaster on the grounds that the injury 
suffered by the security guard was only momentary.   
 These two cases demonstrate the necessity of sentencing 
courts making a factually specific inquiry in each case as to 
whether the injury was "painful and obvious," was "of a type for 
which medical attention ordinarily would be sought," or was more 
than insignificant for some other reason.  The degree of injury 
from mace will differ depending on such factors as the strength 
of the particular product used, the distance between the victim 
and the dispenser, and the angle of delivery.  Accordingly, there 
will undoubtedly be crimes involving the use of mace where no 
"bodily injury" will occur, just as there will be such crimes 
where a victim will experience such injury. 
 We are thus unable to sustain the district court's 
assignment of two points under § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A) based on its 
conclusion that "a victim of mace sustains a significant injury."  
Nor can we uphold its assignment based on the court's reference 
to "immediate medical attention."  The FBI agent did not know, 
and the record does not otherwise reveal, the character of the 
attention given by the paramedics to the tellers, and we agree 
with the Lancaster court that not all contact between a victim 
  
and a health care professional will justify a conclusion that 
"bodily injury" occurred.  The example relating to medical 
attention in the definition of "bodily injury" is intended to 
provide an objective basis for distinguishing significant from 
insignificant injuries.  If, as in Lancaster, medical attention 
would be sought by an ordinarily prudent person for the purpose 
of diagnosis but no treatment ensues, that attention does not 
help to establish the significance of the injury.  Lancaster,  
6 F.3d at 210. 
 The record also does not disclose anything about the 
degree of pain experienced by the tellers.  Moreover, while a 
trier of fact might conceivably draw an inference from the FBI 
agent's testimony that they had injuries obvious to an observer, 
this is not a necessary inference and it is not one that the 
district court drew. 
 On remand, the district court should determine the 
character and duration of the symptoms experienced by the 
tellers, as well as the character of the "medical attention" they 
received.  Only then will it be in a position to determine 
whether Harris' mace inflicted "bodily injury" within the meaning 
of § 2B3.1(b)(3)(A). 
 We add one final note for the guidance of the district 
court when it reevaluates the available reliable evidence and 
makes its findings.  We do not read the Guidelines, as did the 
Lancaster court, to require that an injury be painful and obvious 
for a substantial period of time in order to qualify as a "bodily 
injury."  See Lancaster. 6 F.3d at 210 & n.2.  Moreover, we think 
  
it likely that cases involving mace will arise in which a finding 
of bodily injury will be appropriate despite the absence of 
prolonged effects.  Our thought can be illustrated by reference 
to the promotional literature for Phaser Mace.  As we have 
suggested, given their source and purpose, a trier of fact should 
take the claims in Phaser's promotional literature about its 
immediate effects with a "grain of salt."  Nevertheless, if the 
record in a case established that a maced bank teller had 
symptoms accurately described by those claims for a period of 
more than a moment or two, we believe a district court would be 
justified in concluding that he or she had received a "bodily 
injury."  A blow the effects of which can be shaken off in a 
moment or two may well be an insignificant injury.  Blindness, 
disorientation, breathing difficulty, and extreme discomfort 
sufficient in combination to induce panic for a period of ten to 
fifteen minutes are something else entirely and can rationally be 




 The judgment of the district court will be reversed and 
this matter will be remanded for resentencing only. 
